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Innovation Types and Regulation: The Regulatory Framing of Nanotechnology as 
‘Incremental’ or ‘Radical’ Innovation 
Stijn Smismans and Elen Stokes 
 
The regulatory literature has long been concerned with the challenges of 
technological innovation, yet it says relatively little about what we understand as 
‘innovative’ and how innovation ‘types’ impact on regulation.  This article 
unpacks the concept of ‘innovation’ and analyses its significance for the 
development of regulatory strategy.  It shows that innovation types – such as 
‘incremental’ and ‘radical’ innovation – are not clear-cut but involve differences 
of interpretation.  This interpretive flexibility makes them powerful discursive 
resources in regulatory decision-making.  Through a study of the EU’s regulation 
of nanotechnology, the article shows how arguments of ‘incremental’ and 
‘radical’ innovation can be mobilised to very different effect. These different 
ways of conceptualising new technology affect decisions on: (i) the desirability of 
legislative reform; (ii) the evidence-base for regulation; and (iii) the use of the 
precautionary principle.  The case study also shows how the framing of 
technology as ‘incrementally’ innovative can contribute to a strategy of 
‘deliberate regulatory ignorance’.  The article concludes by arguing that the 
incremental/radical distinction can be put to more positive use, so that regulatory 
choices take account of the different techno-scientific and socio-economic 
dimensions of innovation and its regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between innovation and regulation has attracted significant policy and 
academic attention in recent years.  This is in part because of increased political attention on 
the role of techno-scientific progress in achieving social and economic betterment, but also 
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because of public controversies concerning the regulation of particular high-tech products 
and processes.  Typically, the focus is on how regulation might respond to the risks involved 
in scientific and technological innovation by controlling potential harms to human health or 
the environment. While the types of risks and reasons for intervening may vary, there is a 
general consensus that risk has become ‘the central organising principle in regulation and 
public service delivery’.1  Although this is not unique to the regulation of new technology, it 
may indeed be exacerbated by a perceived need to minimise or eliminate risks created by 
technological advances.  
This article looks beyond the risk regulation literature to the broader literature on 
innovation, in order to bring constructive new insights to a critique of EU regulatory policy.  
In regulatory scholarship, ‘innovation’ is often used as an umbrella term for a range of 
phenomena with which regulation must contend, but relatively little is said about what we 
understand as technologically ‘innovative’ or whether we can distinguish between different 
types and degrees of innovation for the purpose of regulation.  Even less attention is paid to 
‘innovation’ as a discursive practice by which regulation is framed and legitimated.  This 
article shows how different innovation ‘types’ can be important strategic resources, in the 
sense that they actively shape regulatory responses to new technology.   
The article is structured as follows.  Section 2 surveys the different innovation ‘types’ 
in the innovation literature and explains the basic conceptual distinction between ‘radical’ 
and ‘incremental’ innovation.  This literature shows that innovation types are not clear-cut 
but involve differences of both degree and interpretation.  Section 3 investigates, from a 
theoretical perspective, the regulatory consequences of dealing with radical or incremental 
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innovation.  Although the distinction has its roots in product management and organisational 
theory, it nevertheless has purchase in decisions about regulation.  We show that the 
distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘incremental’ innovation may impact on: (i) the desirability 
of a new legislative framework, (ii) the nature and extent of the evidence-base for regulation, 
and (iii) the use of the precautionary principle (PP). 
Having dealt with the distinction from a theoretical perspective, we then analyse how 
the ‘radical versus incremental’ dichotomy has played out in EU regulatory practice, using a 
case study of the EU’s regulation of nanotechnology.  Section 4 examines whether the 
literature on nanotechnology defines this new technology as ‘radically’ or ‘incrementally’ 
innovative.  We show not only how conceptualisations of nanotechnology as ‘radical’ or 
‘incremental’ have influenced the EU’s regulatory approach, but also how the distinction is 
open to various interpretive possibilities and, as such, becomes part of discursive politics of 
justifying different regulatory strategies.  We demonstrate this discursive and strategic 
dimension by contrasting the regulatory responses of the European Commission and the 
European Parliament (Sections 5 and 6).  Whereas the Commission has tended to treat 
nanotechnology as ‘incrementally’ innovative and as not requiring specific regulatory 
provision, the Parliament has focused on the ‘radical’ nature of the technology and the 
corresponding need for regulatory reform.     
Exploring this further, we argue that the Commission’s conceptualisation of 
nanotechnology as ‘incremental’ innovation has enabled a strategy of wilful non-knowing or 
‘deliberate regulatory ignorance’.  Here, we mean ignorance not only in the sense of 
knowledge deficits but also as an active construct.  Through its narrow framing of 
nanotechnology and of possible regulatory responses, the Commission has been able to avoid 
any systematic engagement with broader questions such as the socio-economic implications 
of technological development.   
The case study shows how policymakers effectively frame innovation as ‘incremental’ or 
‘radical’ as a means of steering regulatory responses in particular directions.  We note, in this 
context, that the framing of a technology as ‘incrementally’ innovative may be driven by 
political convenience, and it relieves policymakers of the need to seek further understanding 
of the wider social, economic and environmental implications of technological development.  
In other words, the categorisation of innovation into certain ‘types’ can be a powerful 
legitimating tool in justifying a particular course of regulatory action or inaction.  By 
acknowledging that the incremental/radical distinction is not inevitable but depends, at least 
in part, on different institutional readings of a technology’s ‘innovativeness’, it is possible to 
see innovation ‘types’ not just as objects of governance, but as instruments of governance.  
Moreover, we argue that the incremental/radical distinction could be put to more positive use 
by encouraging reflection on the different dimensions of innovation (techno-scientific and 
socio-economic), and ensuring that the range of issues and complexities is openly and 
systematically taken into account. 
 
2. Innovation ‘Types’ 
Much has been written about the role of regulation in responding to innovation.2  Each of 
these works deal with different examples of innovation in different fields (eg biotechnology, 
financial markets) and together they draw a range of conclusions about how law and 
governance could, or should, be deployed in the solving of innovation-related problems.  One 
of the big questions is whether regulatory responses are sufficient to deal with such rapidly 
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evolving fields, however there has been little systematic investigation of how regulatory 
approaches may differ depending on the nature of the innovation.  Notable exceptions include 
the work of Jasanoff on differences in the legal treatment of new technology depending on 
whether the technology is construed as ‘novel’, ‘natural’ or ‘normal’,3 and that of Ford on the 
idiosyncrasies and challenges of regulating ‘seismic’ and ‘sedimentary’ innovation in the 
financial sector.4  Building on this important and valuable research, we suggest that there is 
further work to be done to understand how innovation ‘types’ contribute to the discursive 
politics of regulation in the EU.  We pursue this line of inquiry, first by identifying different 
degrees of ‘innovativeness’, and then by focusing on how the distinction between ‘radical’ 
and ‘incremental’ innovation can influence regulation.  Whereas previous work has analysed 
the discursive force of regulation in ‘normalising’ radical innovation,5 we approach the issue 
the other way round by examining the discursive force of innovation (and its various 
conceptualisations, eg incremental and radical) in shaping and sustaining particular 
regulatory responses. 
 Innovation studies have produced a rich body of theoretical and empirical research 
into the meaning of ‘innovation’ in different contexts – such as business organisation and 
management,6 marketing,7 and product development.8  We do not detail that work here, but 
we will reflect on some of its general findings.  A first point relates to how innovation is 
defined and by whom.  Innovation implies novelty, but novelty can be determined from a 
range of different perspectives.  A product or a process may be new to the world, the 
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industry, the scientific community, the marketplace, the firm, or the customer.9  Likewise, 
‘novelty’ may be present in any one of a number of different things – it may involve new 
products, service offerings or processes, new benefits, new patterns of consumption, new 
supply chains, new risks, or new functionalities, or all of these elements.10  It may take the 
form of pioneering technological developments or new configurations of existing 
technologies.11  The scale at which innovation is assessed is also important, as it dictates 
whether innovation is understood in narrowly technical terms,12 or whether it encompasses a 
broader range of variables – including organisational, commercial, and social innovations.13  
Abernathy and Clark, for example, draw a distinction between innovation at the level of 
systems and procedures (called ‘architectural’ innovation), which results in new systems of 
production and the creation of new linkages to markets and users,14 and innovation of a more 
precise kind (called ‘niche creation’), which involves refining products or processes to meet 
previously unmet consumer needs.15 
A second observation in the literature is that ‘innovation’ is a question of degree – 
and, even if there is little consensus on the appropriate terminology, it is commonly accepted 
that innovation works in shades of grey rather than black and white.  Innovation is not simply 
a matter of ‘innovative or not’, for some would argue that any change – to products, 
processes or services – involves innovation on some level.  So the critical issue becomes 
‘how innovative?’ (not ‘whether innovative?’), which requires a framework for thinking 
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about innovation along a sliding scale.  Michael E Porter famously distinguished between 
‘continuous’ and ‘discontinuous’ technological evolution in analysing product-market 
competition.16  Abernathy and Clark discussed the contrasts between ‘regular’ and 
‘revolutionary’ innovation in established systems of production and marketing.17  ‘Regular’ 
innovation involves change that builds cumulatively on established technical and production 
competences and is applied to existing markets and consumers. ‘Revolutionary’ innovation, 
on the other hand, is fundamentally disruptive, involving radical market change and rendering 
technical and production facilities or resources obsolete.18  Anderson and Tushman drew a 
similar distinction between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘stochastic’ technological breakthroughs.19  
Revolutionary breakthroughs involve ‘fundamentally different product forms that command a 
decisive cost, performance, or quality advantage over prior product forms’.20  Examples 
include jet engines (rather than piston engines), and electronic typewriters (replacing 
mechanical typewriters).  Accounts such as these suggest that innovation can be defined not 
just in narrowly technical terms, but also in terms of its broader societal implications – jet 
engines having reduced travel time and increased social mobility, and electronic typewriters 
bring about greater speed and legibility in written communication. 
As this sketch shows, the terminology (‘disruptive’, ‘sustaining’, ‘discontinuous’, 
‘continuous’, ‘radical’, ‘incremental’) is ready to hand but can have quite different 
connotations depending on context.  Insofar as it is possible to draw general principles from 
this wide-ranging literature, it can be said that claims of ‘innovativeness’ depend at least in 
part on differences of perspective and interpretation.  Despite this interpretive flexibility, 
ontological distinctions continue to be drawn between ‘radical’ and ‘incremental’ innovation 
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types (or their many variants) as a means of analysing the effects of innovation on, for 
example, firm performance and market structure.  Yet, ‘radical’ innovation and ‘incremental’ 
innovation are more than ontological concepts; they are also important strategic and 
discursive resources.  The remainder of the article looks at how interpretations of innovation 
as ‘radical’ or ‘incremental’ can be taken up in competing frames of policy discourse.  As 
different ways of representing technological innovation, the labels ‘radical’ and ‘incremental’ 
can proliferate different policy responses and have different political or strategic uses. 
 
3. Regulating ‘Radical’ or ‘Incremental’ Innovation 
From a regulatory perspective, we focus here on the common ground in the definitions 
provided in this literature, by considering innovation on a continuum between on the one 
hand, more radical innovation, and on the other hand, more incremental innovation.  We 
consider that innovation may be ‘radical’ for two main reasons: either due to the ‘technical’ 
scientific novelty of a product or process or both, or because of its significant wider socio-
economic implications.  The two do not always go hand in hand.  As has been noted, an 
‘incremental’ technical development may still have a major socio-economic impact due, for 
example, to its creation of new markets, its promise of a ‘revolutionised’ economy or its 
bringing of new benefits to health and the environment, or both.  The converse is also true, 
since a ‘radical’ technical development will not automatically or necessarily have a dramatic 
impact on society more generally.   
It is useful to keep these two different dimensions (techno-scientific; socio-economic) 
in mind when considering how the distinction between radical and incremental innovation 
may impact on regulatory choices.  In this section we argue that the conceptualisation of 
innovation as ‘radical’ or ‘incremental’ may influence the regulatory approaches in three 
main ways: as it relates to legislative reform, evidence-based regulation, and the 
precautionary principle (PP).  Our analysis in this section is theoretical, in the sense that it is 
independent of our subsequent case study on nanotechnology regulation in the EU, but it is 
particularly well exemplified in the context of EU governance.  While we identify some 
normative arguments (related to, for instance, democratic accountability and evidence-based 
policymaking) on how the ‘incremental’/‘radical’ distinction can inspire regulatory choices,  
we stress that policymakers may rely on a more pragmatic and strategic use of the distinction.  
 
3.1 ‘Radical’ vs. ‘incremental’ innovation and the desirability of a new legislative framework 
The overarching question, to which commentators often return, is whether a newly emerging 
technology is so novel, so ‘radically different’, that it has outstripped the capacity of existing 
regulation to deal with it.  As case studies have shown, it will rarely (if ever) be the case that 
a technology is so new that there is no applicable law in the area.21  It may be questioned, 
however, whether existing regulations are sufficiently well equipped to cope with the patterns 
and consequences of any given technological advance.  Therefore, the question ‘how 
innovative?’ is of central importance to decisions about regulation because the more ‘novel’ a 
technology is deemed to be, the more likely it is to be ‘disconnected’ from the regulatory 
framework, leaving policymakers and other stakeholders unable to say exactly how the 
regulation applies.22  So, where innovation is understood to be ‘radical’ there may be calls for 
legislative reform.  Conversely, it may be assumed that innovation labelled as ‘incremental’ 
can be dealt under existing rules and regulations.  
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Indeed, a normative case can be made for dealing with ‘radical’ innovation at the 
legislative level.  Radical innovation will not always or even usually warrant an entirely new 
legislative framework or new legislative provisions.  But, we would suggest, there are several 
reasons for ensuring that such decisions are at least discussed as part of the legislative 
process.  Existing regulatory measures may be ill-suited to dealing with the risks, 
opportunities and other challenges associated with an emerging technology.  Relying on 
‘inherited’ legislation – legislation designed before the latest technological development was 
envisaged or became available – can have limitations.23  For example, the legislation may 
have gaps in content or be out of step with changing social norms.  What is more, because 
‘radical’ innovation may bring about significant change not just in terms of technological 
production, performance or cost but also as regards broader social and political effects, and 
because difficult trade-offs may need to be made between competing values and interests, it 
is reasonable to expect that these issues would be discussed at legislative level – so that the 
pros and cons of legislative reform, and indeed of the technology itself, are considered in an 
open and accountable manner.  ‘Radical’ innovation is also associated with higher (as 
compared with ‘incremental’ innovation) levels of scientific uncertainty and public 
contestation,24 and so, from a democratic perspective, there are compelling reasons for 
addressing such issues through the legislative procedure, rather than just at the executive 
level during the implementation of existing rules and regulations. 
While there is a normative, democratic case to be made for radical innovation to be 
addressed through legislative debate, in order to have open debate about difficult trade-offs, 
policymakers might make strategic, discursive use of the incremental/radical distinction with 
quite the opposite effect.  In other words, policymakers might perceive the socio-economic 
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benefits of a technology as ‘radically’ new, but describe the technology as ‘incrementally’ 
innovative in technical terms thereby avoiding the need for a new legislative framework 
which might otherwise stifle innovation.  It can also be the case that risk-based regulation 
does less well at ‘seeing’ or detecting incremental innovation, and so unappreciates its 
significance.25 
 
3.2 ‘Radical’ vs. ‘incremental’ innovation and evidence-based policymaking 
The distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘incremental’ innovation may also affect the evidence-
base for regulation, particularly the use of different evidence-gathering tools and procedures. 
In the case of ‘incremental’ innovation, it may often be enough to gather evidence via risk 
assessments at the executive stage of implementing existing legislation.  Risk assessment is 
applied in areas involving exposures to potential harm, such as in fields chemicals or food 
regulation, where the development of new products and processes bring benefits but may also 
threaten the protection of public health or the environment.  Risk assessment typically relies 
on scientific expertise gathered or institutionalised ‘independently’, at a distance from the 
political arm of decision-making.  Within the EU governance structure, risk assessment 
applies predominantly in the day-to-day implementation of legislation, in situations where 
agencies and expert committees provide the Commission with independent scientific advice 
to decide, for example, whether to authorise a particular product or substance.  Although such 
risk assessment – conducted at the executive level and predominantly techno-scientific in 
nature – may be sufficient for incremental innovation, radical innovation can pose bigger 
challenges to evidence-based policymaking.  
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Radical innovation is described as inhabiting a ‘high uncertainty’ domain,26 and the 
greater the departure from existing technological products/processes (ie the more ‘radical’ it 
is), the greater the potential unknowns and epistemic challenges.  The product management 
literature, for example, shows that radically innovative products can be accompanied by 
increased uncertainty in four different respects: technical, market, organisational and 
resources.27  Increased uncertainty may also be seen in terms of health and environmental 
risks and socio-economic impacts.  This poses obvious challenges in terms of evidence-
gathering, but, given the EU’s commitment to evidence-based decision-making, it must at 
least be arguable that the higher the levels of uncertainty, the greater the need to broaden the 
view of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ evidence for regulatory action.  In other words, it 
invites policymakers to go the extra mile to gather information from a wider range of sources, 
to identify the main points of contention and to give a clearer indication of the nature and 
extent of the unknowns – not just those relating to technical risk but also those stemming 
from the socio-economic complexity of innovation. 
In EU governance, the obvious instrument to provide a wider evidence-base for 
policymaking is the integrated impact assessment (IIA).28  Since 2003, the European 
Commission has operated a system IIA aimed at assessing the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of all new legislative and major policy measures.  Unlike risk 
assessments, IIAs are drafted by the European Commission itself, requiring the gathering of 
wider-ranging evidence, including consultation with stakeholders.  This is particularly 
relevant when contemplating the regulation of technology that is ‘radically’ innovative not 
only (or even mainly) in the techno-scientific sense, but also (or rather) as regards its socio-
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economic implications.  In theory, at least, IIAs provide systematic means of assessing, on an 
equal basis, the likely economic, environmental and social implications – including but not 
just in terms of risk – and highlighting the main potential trade-offs involved in regulation.  
We recognise that the IIA is not perfect and raises its own set of questions,29 but under 
current arrangements it is the only formal procedure under which these broader trade-offs can 
be routinely made (e.g. between risks and wider socio-economic impacts, or between the 
objectives of risk management and innovation policy).   
Hence, there is a normative argument for the regulation of radical innovation to rely 
not only on risk assessment but also on IIA, particularly if risk assessment is limited to the 
day-to-day implementation of existing regulatory frameworks.  Moreover, given the 
potentially significant consequences of radical innovation, it is arguably more appropriate to 
attempt to balance these considerations using an IIA at the legislative level so that the wider 
evidence-base can be fully debated.  But while this may be normatively desirable in terms of 
evidence-based policymaking and democratic accountability, policymakers may in fact 
follow exactly the opposite strategy.  By framing a technology as merely ‘incrementally’ 
innovative, it is possible to narrow the evidence-base of policymaking.  Such an approach, 
which may be characterised as ‘wilful regulatory ignorance’,30 can be used to avoid the 
prospect of new legislation and thereby circumvent the need for an IIA.  
 
3.3 ‘Radical’ vs. ‘incremental’ and the PP 
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The distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘incremental’ innovation can also determine whether 
and how regulatory decisions are based on the PP.  This relates strongly to the question of 
evidence above.  To understand how defining innovation as either ‘radical’ or ‘incremental’ 
may affect regulatory choices about the PP, we first need to take a closer look at the 
relationship between the PP and evidence.  The PP enjoys pre-eminence in EU law, as a 
constitutional principle in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.31  Generally speaking, the 
principle requires decision-makers to be attuned to the problems caused by scientific 
uncertainty, and is used to justify regulatory action when supporting evidence is lacking.  Yet 
its relationship with evidence-based policymaking is not self-explanatory.  Some have even 
argued that the PP and evidence-based policy sit at opposite ends of the spectrum, and EU 
institutions have been accused of implementing the PP in ways that are ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’32 and irrational.33  One of the criticisms is that the PP is ‘anti-science’ because it 
encourages decisions based not on scientific fact but on unsubstantiated fear.34  But even a 
cursory inspection of relevant EU documents reveals that the PP does not provide a blank 
cheque for regulatory intervention35 and that evidence of some sort is needed before being 
invoked.   
While there differing views on how much evidence is ‘enough’ for the PP to apply, 
experience has shown that decisions in this context are approached in a highly rationalistic 
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manner and kept within certain methodological limits.36  Rather than dictating a particular 
outcome, the PP governs the process by which regulatory decisions are made.37   
At EU level, we can distinguish between an ‘ex ante’ and an ‘ex post evidence’ 
dimension to the PP.  The ‘ex ante dimension’ relates to the evidence policy-makers have to 
provide when invoking the PP.  First, the Commission notes that the PP ‘should be 
considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk’.38  Thus, a conditio sine qua 
non of the PP is risk assessment. Even if risks cannot be ‘fully’ demonstrated by conclusive 
scientific evidence, application of the PP requires at least some evidence of the reality and 
seriousness of the potential adverse effects.  Risk assessment comprises hazard identification, 
hazard characterisation, appraisal of exposure and risk characterisation, and ‘[a]n attempt to 
complete as far as possible these four components should be performed before action is 
taken’.39  Secondly, action taken on the basis of the PP should respond ‘proportionately’ to 
the potential risk.40  What is ‘proportionate’ will depend on the outcome of a cost-benefit 
analysis, by which the most likely consequences of action and inaction are compared.41  
Importantly, the Commission states that cost-benefit analysis should be wide in scope and 
‘other analysis methods, such as those concerning … the socio-economic impact … may also 
be relevant’.42   The more recent Better Regulation package of the Commission, therefore 
requires that a ‘proportionate impact assessment’ has to be adopted whenever the PP is 
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invoked.43  Although there is some legal ambiguity on the extent to which such a 
‘proportionate impact assessment’ has to constitute a proper IIA, assessing as widely on 
socio-economic impacts and following particular consultation requirements with 
stakeholders, it is clear that regulatory measures based on the PP cannot be adopted without 
any evidence.  A series of procedural steps must be taken, including a risk assessment to 
make an initial calculation of the probability/magnitude of harm, and a proportionate impact 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposed action.    
There is also an ‘ex post evidence’ aspect to the PP, requiring additional evidence 
gathering measures once a regulatory act based on the PP has been adopted.  This should 
enable decision-makers to conduct a more detailed risk assessment in the future and revise 
the regulatory measures if necessary.  According to the Commission, ‘[d]ecision-makers 
faced with an unacceptable risk, scientific uncertainty and public concerns have a duty to find 
answers’.44   Any risk management measure adopted on the basis of the PP should go 
‘together with collection of additional evidence and review’45 and should be ‘subject to 
review, in the light of new scientific data’ and ‘capable of assigning responsibility for 
producing the scientific evidence necessary’.46      
The framing of innovation as ‘incremental’ or ‘radical’ can influence the role of the 
PP and its evidence dimensions in different ways.  Given that ‘incremental’ innovation is said 
to involve iterative change and is derivative of existing products and processes, it is often 
viewed as presenting low or ‘acceptable’ risks and/or low uncertainty.  As such, it may easily 
fall outside the scope of the PP, either because there is sufficient information available for 
appropriate preventive measures to be taken or because the desired level of health or 
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environmental protection is not jeopardised.47  However, this implies the risk of narrowing 
the evidence base of the decision-making.  In the event that ‘incremental’ innovation fails to 
trigger the PP (and hence a proportionate impact assessment), there is no formal, 
institutionalised ex ante method of analysing the broader socio-economic impacts as a matter 
of routine.  Of course, there may be other, ad hoc ways of ensuring that the broader impacts 
of incremental innovation are taken into account (through for example, practices of 
Responsible Research and Innovation,48 but absent any expectation or obligation to do so, 
there is a danger that the wider setting of innovation – its economic, environmental and social 
circumstances – will be overlooked.   
If a technology is framed as radical in nature, it is more likely that the PP will be 
invoked, as it is associated with high or ‘unacceptable’ risks and/or high uncertainty. In the 
event that the PP is applied, both its ex ante (risk assessment, impact assessment) and ex post 
(further data collection and periodic review) stages of evidence-gathering will come into 
play.   However, within the current EU governance framework, the evidential narrowness and 
lack of empirical ambition of the PP may even arise in cases of radical innovation.  As 
mentioned above, at ex ante level, the requirement to adopt a ‘proportionate impact 
assessment’ when invoking PP is not necessarily as extensive as the wider evidence base of 
an IIA.  Moreover, at the ex post stage, decision-makers are required to assign responsibility 
for producing the scientific evidence needed for a more comprehensive risk assessment, but 
there is no equivalent duty to continue to gather information on socio-economic 
considerations once the PP has been applied.   
The overall effect is that broader concerns relating to innovation can receive short 
shrift (either because of a failure to trigger ex ante evidence-gathering or because ex post 
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evidence-gathering operates within narrowly circumscribed limits).  Although the framing of 
innovation as ‘incremental’ or ‘radical’ will help to determine whether the PP applies, that 
distinction could in fact be put to more worthwhile use.  As scholars in science and 
technology studies and cultural studies have long called on decision-makers and policy actors 
to bridge the divide between techno-scientific and socio-economic risk analyses,49 we 
contend that a more creative use of ‘incremental’ and ‘radical’ innovation types would 
represent an important step in that direction.   Decisions on whether the PP will be invoked, 
and the evidence related to that, should start from the acknowledgement that a technical 
innovation can be radical or incremental for techno-scientific reasons and/or for socio-
economic reasons.  A particular innovation may present a low or acceptable level of risk in 
techno-scientific terms (‘incremental’) but also wide-ranging and uncertain socio-economic 
impacts (‘radical’).   Similarly, an innovation may pose a high or unacceptable risk and high 
uncertainty in techno-scientific terms (‘radical’) but be expected to have limited socio-
economic implications (‘incremental’).50  In the spirit if not the letter of the PP, either 
variation could prompt ex ante evidence-gathering and ex post efforts to gather further 
information on the full gamut of policy-relevant issues, including both techno-scientific and 
socio-economic concerns.   
To summarise, the framing of a technology as ‘incremental’ or ‘radical’ may impact 
on the regulatory approach in several ways; namely, by influencing the desirability of 
legislative reform, the use of evidence-gathering tools and the application of the PP.  
Policymakers may make strategic use of framing innovation in one way or another to support 
their preferred regulatory solution.  The categorisation of innovation as ‘incremental’, for 
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instance, can be used to avoid the high demands of evidence-based policymaking (or narrow 
its significance) or avoid new legislative action based on the PP.  At the same time, the 
‘incremental’ versus ‘radical’ divide, acknowledging its dimensions along both the techno-
scientific and socio-economic dimensions, could provide a more nuanced guide to the 
application of the PP, the choice of regulatory intervention and the evidence on which it is 
based.  
We now turn to the example of EU nanotechnology regulation to show how ideas of 
‘incremental’ and ‘radical’ innovation have come to frame not only the policy debate but also 
the regulatory responses (in terms of legislative reform, evidence-gathering and the PP).  To 
begin with, we give a brief introduction to nanotechnology and highlight the divergence of 
opinion as to its ‘innovativeness’.   
 
4. Nanotechnology: Radical Breakthroughs or Incremental Improvements? 
‘Nanotechnology’ involves the creation or manipulation of materials at a tiny scale, the 
‘nanoscale’.51  Nanomaterials have extremely small dimensions in the range 1-100 
nanometres, one nanometre being one billionth of a metre.52  Materials are deliberately 
engineered at the nanoscale they can have very different properties from their everyday 
equivalents. The capacity to produce materials with new and desirable properties has the 
potential to benefit many industrial and commercial sectors, and this potential is beginning to 
be realised.  
A good deal of attention is paid to the extent to which the products and processes of 
nanotechnology differ from those resulting from conventional means.  Hotly debated are the 
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possible applications of nanotechnology, as well as their potential risks and uncertainties.  
First, discussions of theoretically possible but currently infeasible uses of nanotechnology 
tend to focus on its revolutionary nature and disruptive potential.53  Here, accounts may even 
stray into the realm of science fiction, such as that of Drexler who sees a role for 
nanotechnology in space colonisation: ‘Low-cost, lightweight, extremely strong materials 
would make transportation far more energy efficient and – finally – make space 
transportation economical.  The old dreams of expanding the biosphere beyond our one 
vulnerable planet suddenly look feasible once more’.54  His more controversial claims include 
that ‘nanorobots … could destroy viruses and cancer cells, repair damaged structures, remove 
accumulated wastes from the brain, and bring the body back to a state of youthful health’.55  
By any reckoning, those descriptions seem far-fetched, but especially when compared with 
more modest claims that current applications of nanotechnology ‘are actually incremental 
advances in well-developed areas of science’.56  Others suggest that nanotechnology is 
seriously over-hyped, since ‘neither its ideas nor embodiment are entirely new’ and 
‘nanoscale science has been commonplace in biology and chemistry... for many decades’.57 
As such, there are conflicting views about the extent to which the idea, method or 
application of nanotechnology is radically or incrementally new, and there is a limit to how 
far generalisations can be made about ‘nanotechnology’ – an umbrella term used to capture a 
huge variety of products and processes across diverse sectors and over different timeframes 
(ie present, near future, distant future).  Such conflict is also apparent in debates about the 
potential risks associated with nanotechnologies.  Although it is believed that some 
applications of nanotechnology ‘will present risks unlike any that we have encountered 
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before’,58 there is disagreement about the degree to which those risks are new.  Not all 
nanomaterials will be more hazardous than substances in their conventional form, but it is 
conceivable that some could cause unexpected interactions with the environment59 or human 
beings.60  After all, one of the attractions of nanotechnology is that it enables the engineering 
of nanomaterials that have new physical or chemical properties, and that exhibit behaviours 
quite unlike the same materials in bulk form.  Concerns have been raised, therefore, that the 
very properties of nanomaterials that make them commercially so attractive could potentially 
pose unforeseen risks.61  Whether those properties produce ‘radically’ or ‘incrementally’ 
different risk profiles rather depends on the context in which such a determination is made.62  
But while one might speculate about the unusual properties and toxicity of certain 
nanomaterials, they can in some circumstances be difficult to characterise with precision.  
And while initial evidence suggests that certain nanomaterials, in certain exposure scenarios, 
may present an increased hazard, it is not always clear what this means in terms of risk – 
because of gaps in technical data or a lack of applicable test methods.63  This may be thought 
of as uncertainty in the ‘straightforward’ sense of incomplete information, which, it is 
presumed, can be overcome by closing knowledge gaps and developing suitable metrics – in 
other words, by ‘doing more science’.  But uncertainty also exists in relation to the ‘non-
technical’ aspects of nanotechnology, given that there has been little evidence-gathering on 
issues such as the public acceptability of the technology and its various applications.  As the 
science and technology studies literature has shown, the ‘facts’ about a technology are multi-
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faceted, and often highly contested and inconclusive – certainly in the early stages of the 
technology’s emergence.64  This presents significant challenges for policymakers, especially 
since regulation is expected to be based on clear evidence and ‘sound science’.65 
From this we can note that a technology may be regarded as an ‘incremental’ 
development in some ways but a ‘radical’ departure in others.  For example, its potential risks 
may be seen as a mere continuation of those associated with existing technological 
products/processes, and yet in terms of uncertainty and contingency it may be deemed to be 
socially, economically and/or materially different.  This separating out of the risks from the 
broader effects is evident in the case of nanotechnology, where emphasis is on both the 
evolutionary (‘incremental’) nature of potential harms and the revolutionary (‘radical)’ 
promise of far-reaching benefits.  Take, for instance, the application of nanotechnology to the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries.  While techniques of nanotechnology in these sectors 
‘are another incremental advance in nanoscale science’, so the argument goes, their broader 
impact on the economy and society ‘may be substantial’.66 
So there is no easy answer to the question, is nanotechnology ‘radically’ or 
‘incrementally’ innovative?  Much depends on the focus, perspective and indeed imagination 
of the observer.  Given the fluidity and constructedness of the boundaries between different 
innovation ‘types’, one might well conclude that such a division has little normative force.  
And yet, we find the categorisation at the heart of the EU’s regulation of nanotechnology.  
Even though the EU institutions rarely use the terms ‘incremental’ and ‘radical’, these ideas 
carry important political and strategic implications.  So the question whether nanotechnology 
is radical or incremental in nature, while unsatisfactory in many regards, has had a pivotal 
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role in constructing regulatory responses.  More precisely, the European Commission and the 
European Parliament have taken very different stances on the ‘innovativeness’ of 
nanotechnology, which is in turn reflected in their polar opposite positions on the nature and 
extent of evidence-based regulation in this context. 
 
5. The European Commission and the Regulation of ‘Incremental’ Innovation 
Let us start with the European Commission’s characterisation of nanotechnology as 
‘incremental’ innovation, and examine how this characterisation has resulted in an approach 
to regulation based on existing legislation, evidence-gathering at the executive level, a lack of 
active engagement with the PP and an avoidance of IIA.  The Commission is of the view that 
new applications of nanotechnology fall squarely within the remit of existing regulations, 
notwithstanding that the regulations were introduced long before applications of 
nanotechnology became commercially available and viable.67  Existing regulations are broad 
in scope and establish general, technology-neutral standards of health and environmental 
safety, and there is no shortage of regulatory coverage in sectors in which nanotechnology is 
currently used (such as chemicals, foods, medicines and cosmetics).  The General Product 
Safety Directive, for instance, requires manufacturers and suppliers to ensure that their 
products are safe before being place on the EU market.68  With limited exceptions, the 
Directive covers all products intended for, or likely to be used by, consumers, and it does not 
distinguish between products of different technological origin and/or material size.  Sector-
specific legislation imposes similarly generic standards of safety.  The General Food Law, for 
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example, stipulates that food ‘shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe’.69  It applies to 
all food products, whether or not they contain nanomaterial ingredients. 
It is worth noting that many of these existing legislative measures contain references 
to or are based on the PP.  The General Food Regulation provides that, where harmful effects 
on health have been identified through scientific assessment but scientific uncertainty 
persists, a Member State may adopt provisional risk management measures based on the PP 
until further scientific information becomes available.70  So engagement with the PP occurs if 
and when a Member State choose to adopt a risk management measure on this basis – 
although outside these confines, the PP features little in the Commission’s discussion of 
nanotechnology regulation.  On the application of chemicals regulation to nanotechnology, 
for example, the Commission notes that the relevant legislation is already underpinned by the 
PP.71  In other words, the Commission adopts a deferential approach, meaning that discussion 
of the PP is limited to observations that the principle is already enshrined in EU product 
legislation.  Its usage is thus confined to the implementation stage of existing legislative 
measures and individual executive decisions – either by Member States where market entry is 
regulated at national level, or by the Commission assisted by comitology where legislative 
implementation is centralised. 
Given that existing regulations are broad in remit, establish generic standards of 
safety and take into account the PP, the Commission concludes that ‘current legislation 
covers to a large extent risks in relation to nanomaterials and that risks can be dealt with 
under the current legislative framework’.72  In other words, there is no need for substantive 
legislative reform.  Nanotechnology is does not present ‘radically’ different risks such that it 
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necessitates new legislative provisions.  Instead, the Commission approaches nanotechnology 
as ‘incremental’ innovation that can be dealt with under existing regulatory regimes.  It is 
interesting that the scope and content of existing regulatory measures should inform 
understandings of technological novelty like this.73 
 Such framing has important implications for the evidence gathered in the 
policymaking process.  Because it has not presented any new legislative or major policy 
initiatives to deal with nanotechnology – preferring instead to rely on existing regulations –  
the Commission has not undertaken any IIAs on the issue (with one exception).74  This does 
not mean a complete absence of evidence-gathering in EU policymaking on nanotechnology.   
Rather, it means that evidence-gathering has taken place predominantly in the application of 
the existing regulatory regimes, by way of scientific assessment at the executive level.  There 
are numerous examples of this. For instance, the Commission’s scientific committees have 
published several opinions on consumer safety, public health and environmental issues 
associated with nanotechnologies generally.  The Scientific Committee on Emerging and 
Newly Identified Health Risks has issued opinions on matters such as the risk assessment of 
products of nanotechnologies75 and on the appropriateness of methodologies for testing the 
potential risks of nanotechnologies.76  The scientific committees have also produced a series 
of ad hoc risk assessments for specific applications of nanotechnology.  For example, the 
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Committee on Consumer Safety has published risk assessments for the use of nanoscale 
titanium dioxide77 and carbon black78 in cosmetic products.   
Other opportunities for evidence-gathering arise under the sector-specific legislation. 
For instance, the Community Action Rolling Plan under EU chemicals legislation specifies 
which chemical substances are to be subject to in-depth evaluation.  Member States 
contribute to the development of the Community Action Rolling Plan by proposing chemical 
substances for inclusion.  A number of Member States have initiated substance evaluation 
activities for various nanomaterials: for example, the Netherlands proposed the evaluation of 
nanomaterial silicon dioxide, due to concerns about the characterisation and toxicity of 
nanoparticle-forms of the substance;79 and Germany has similarly proposed multi-walled 
carbon nanotubes because of concerns about possible risks posed to consumers and 
workers.80 The Member State’s Competent Authority will evaluate the substance before 
preparing a draft decision or conclusion document (depending on the sufficiency of available 
information).  
Several points are worth noting. One is that the evidence gathered during these 
processes relates to issues of science. Scientific input is, of course, essential to evaluating the 
risks involved in applications of nanotechnology, even if it is not the only source of policy-
relevant knowledge.  A cursory survey of the evidence-gathering exercises on 
nanotechnology reveals that an overwhelming majority of them are focused on the technical 
aspects of regulation nanotechnology, such as how to assess the risks of nanomaterials 
already covered by EU regulation.  Much less attention has been paid to the broader types of 
information that would normally be collected and analysed through IIA.  That is not to say 
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that there is no room for considering broader socio-economic factors.  For instance, provision 
is made under the REACH Regulation for certain decisions, in certain circumstances, to take 
into account the socio-economic implications of authorising or not authorising a chemical 
substance81 – however, the limited scope of the provision means that it is not routinely 
engaged. As a result, the approach taken to the socio-economic aspects of nanotechnology 
may be described as ad hoc rather than principled.  Moreover, by concentrating its efforts on 
regulatory implementation (rather than on legislative reform, which would automatically be 
subject to an IIA), the Commission bypasses broader questions about the direction of 
technological progress, the public acceptability of the risks involved, and the fair distribution 
of costs and benefits.  
For the purpose of regulation, the Commission’s characterisation of nanotechnology 
as ‘incremental’ innovation is based on techno-scientific claims of risk.  When dealing with 
research and innovation policy, however, the Commission’s framing of nanotechnology is 
rather different.  There the Commission underlines the radical potential of nanotechnology, 
describing it as a ‘key enabling technology’ in the EU’s quest to achieve a highly innovative, 
knowledge-based economy.82  According to its strategy for the ‘Innovation Union’, 
nanotechnology will play a key role in the EU’s expanding markets and increased global 
competitiveness.83  The Commission notes that nanotechnology has ‘huge commercial 
potential’ and that ‘the potential of nanotechnology to do good, or at least to make a profit, is 
clearly immense’.84  Nanotechnology is said to hold ‘the promise of leading to the 
development of smart nano and micro devices and systems and to radical breakthroughs in 
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vital fields such as healthcare, energy, environment and manufacturing’.85  Moreover, the 
Commission describes nanotechnology as having ‘revolutionary impact’ in materials science, 
information and communications technology, life sciences and consumer products ‘once the 
research is translated into breakthrough products and production processes’.86 
The Commission concludes that ‘scientists and businessmen are unanimous: 
nanotechnology is much more than just a new “hype”’.87  But this supports a particular vision 
of nanotechnology – as offering a great deal of promise – while downplaying complexity, 
uncertainty and controversy.88  Yet general claims about the benefits of nanotechnology are 
supported by little evidence, and no serious attempts have been made to hold them to 
account.  Although the IIA is one forum in which the weighing-up, trading-off and balancing 
of competing claims could take place, this option has not been pursued as a matter of course. 
Whereas the Commission makes broad claims about the ‘radical’ benefits of 
nanotechnology in the context of innovation policy, it approaches the issue of regulation as 
involving ‘incremental’ innovation governable by existing legislation and at the executive 
level of risk assessment.  By deploying arguments of ‘mere incremental change’, the 
Commission employs a strategy of ‘deliberate regulatory ignorance’89 and avoids having to 
establish a broader evidence base or conduct democratically accountable debate to provide 
reasons for its regulatory choice.  One might wonder whether the Commission’s approach has 
been influence by previous regulatory controversies involving technological innovation, such 
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as the cultivation and marketing of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  The 
Commission has been heavily criticised for its handling of GMO regulation,90 and it is 
understandable that it would want to avoid similar reproach by downplaying the need for 
more extensive debate in the context of nanotechnology. 
 
6. Regulating ‘Radical’ Innovation and the Response of the European Parliament 
So far we have shown how, in formulating its regulatory response, the Commission 
characterises nanotechnology as a type ‘incremental’ innovation that does not require new 
legislation, IIA or active engagement with the PP.  By contrast, the European Parliament sees 
nanotechnology as an example of ‘radical’ innovation in need of legislative reform (and 
hence an accompanying IIA) based on the PP.  So, unlike the Commission, which has 
interpreted nanotechnology as adequately covered by existing legislative frameworks, the 
Parliament does not accept that existing regulations are fit for purpose.91 
The Parliament’s Environment Committee has been especially critical of the 
Commission for providing only a general overview of existing legislation and for failing to 
consider the specific properties, uses, risks and benefits of nanotechnology.  For example, it 
remarks that ‘the Commission's analysis is based on a one-dimensional, legalistic overview of 
the current rules but those rules are about as effective in addressing nanotechnology as trying 
to catch plankton with a cod fishing net’.92  It says it ‘deplores the absence of a proper 
evaluation of the de facto application of the general provisions of Community law in the light 
of the actual nature of nanomaterials’,93 and disagrees with the Commission’s view that the 
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full implications of nanotechnology are appropriately covered.94  In its Resolution on the 
matter, the Parliament highlights that ‘nanomaterials have the potential to bring about far-
ranging societal change’,95 and ‘[c]alls on the Commission and Member States to pay special 
attention to the social dimension of the development of nanotechnology’.96  It goes on to 
argue that nanomaterials should be treated as ‘new’ substances under existing regulation, so 
that they are assessed separately from conventional types of material.97  Moreover, the 
Parliament calls for ‘nano-specific amendments to relevant horizontal and sectoral 
legislation’.98  
Such an approach is based, at least in part, on the idea that legislative amendment is 
justified on grounds of the PP.  For example, the European Parliament argues that 
nanomaterials ‘should be covered by a multi-faceted, differentiated and adaptive body of law 
based on the precautionary principle’,99 citing the Commission’s earlier Communication on 
the Precautionary Principle as a reason for introducing new legislative provision.  This 
stands in contrast with the Commission’s approach to nanotechnology, which is premised on 
the idea that the PP is already operative under the EU acquis.  This illustrates how different 
ideas about the role and functioning of the PP can rest on different conceptions of innovation. 
One might expect from the foregoing that that the European Parliament’s opposite 
stance on nanotechnology would also open up the possibility of IIAs, based on engagement 
with the PP.  Yet the situation is not so straightforward, and it is important to remember that 
any discursive framing of innovation types takes place against a complex legal and political 
backdrop.  Although the Parliament perceives nanotechnology to be at the ‘radical’ end of the 
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innovation spectrum (having the potential to effect ‘far-ranging societal change’100 and 
requiring at least some consideration of a dedicated legal framework), its limited institutional 
powers mean that it cannot draft new legislation on the matter.  Instead, new legislation 
depends on the initiative of the Commission – which, as shown above, has not been 
forthcoming.  
To overcome this practical difficulty, the Parliament has adopted a strategy of tabling 
nano-specific amendments whenever existing legislation comes up for periodic review by the 
Commission.101  During periodic review, the Commission has proposed various revisions to 
measures of existing legislation but none of its proposals (with one exception, discussed 
below) has made any reference to ‘nanomaterials’ or ‘nanotechnology’.  The European 
Parliament, during its first or second readings of the Commission’s proposals, has inserted 
nano-specific provisions to the legislative text.  Through this approach, it has succeeded in 
introducing legislative requirements for nanotechnology in sectors of food,102 cosmetic 
products,103 electrical and electronic equipment,104 and biocidal products.105  For example, 
authorised biocidal products containing nanomaterials must now carry a label listing all 
nanomaterial ingredients, followed by the word ‘nano’ in brackets.106  Cosmetic products 
containing nanomaterials must similarly be labelled, and be notified to the Commission 
before being placed on the market.107  So just as the Commission has used arguments of 
‘incremental’ innovation to justify the legislative status quo, so too has the European 
Parliament relied on claims of ‘radical’ innovation to instigate legislative change.  
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Following this line of thought, it seems reasonable to suppose that the European 
Parliament’s approach would also have resulted in more systematic engagement with the PP 
through the use of ex ante and/or ex post gathering and analysis of evidence.  Curiously 
enough, though, the Parliament has also failed to carry out any impact assessment – in spite 
of its criticisms of the Commission for neglecting the wider implications of nanotechnology 
regulation.  It transpires that the way in which the regulatory framework evolved has 
important consequences for the evidence on which it is based.  Since the nano-specific 
amendments were introduced by the Parliament, none were subject to an IIA by the 
Commission.  At the same time, however, the European Parliament failed to live up to its 
commitment to adopt its own impact assessment on any substantive amendments that it 
proposes.  Such a commitment was made in the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Law-making108 and the 2005 Interinstitutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment,109 
and is repeated in the new Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making proposed in 
2015.110  Yet none of the Parliament’s amendments concerning nanotechnology have been 
accompanied by an impact assessment.  This suggests one or a combination of things; the 
Parliament might not have conceived of its amendments as ‘substantive’, or it might not have 
had the time or resources to devote to an impact assessment.111  Whatever the case may be, it 
suggests that arguments of ‘radical’ innovation have justificatory force – in the same way that 
arguments of ‘incremental’ innovation have justificatory force, albeit in the opposite direction 
– but their normative and methodological (ie evidence-gathering) implications need to be 
more carefully worked through.   
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The result is that the newly amended regulatory framework now applicable to 
nanotechnology has a thin evidence base.  One way of redressing this would be to require a 
more explicit treatment of the different dimensions of innovation – techno-scientific and 
socio-economic – and a more liberal reading of the PP, so that scientific uncertainty and 
potentially adverse effects in either dimension would prompt appropriate evidence-gathering 
and evaluation.  We have seen above how decision-makers can have a tendency to deal with 
one dimension or the other in matters of regulation (the Commission with the techno-
scientific aspects; and the European Parliament with the socio-economic concerns).  In order 
to ensure that both receive due attention, and so that future legislative amendment on 
nanotechnology is subject to (or more seriously considered for) IIA as a matter of routine, it 
is important to ensure that techno-scientific and socio-economic considerations are built into 
processes for regulating innovation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored the concept of innovation to show the importance of nuance 
in thinking about regulatory responses, and to highlight both the strategic and normative force 
of particular innovation ‘types’.  By relying on a broader innovation literature, and taking our 
cue from the study of financial products regulation,112 we have distinguished between 
‘radical’ and ‘incremental’ innovation and assessed the implications of this distinction for EU 
regulatory policy.  Acknowledging that the distinction is not clear-cut but a question of 
degree, we have argued that whether one is dealing with ‘radical’ or ‘incremental’ innovation 
may have an impact on the choice of regulatory framework, the use of the PP, and the nature 
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and extent of the evidence-base.   The case study of nanotechnology regulation shows how 
the distinction has played out in practice in this particular field.   
The EU’s regulatory approach to nanotechnology is characterised by a tension 
between the Commission, which approaches the issue as one of ‘incremental’ innovation, and 
the European Parliament, which sees nanotechnology in more ‘radical’ terms.  Although the 
Commission makes broad and often unsubstantiated claims about the radical socio-economic 
potential of nanotechnology, its regulatory approach has focused on nanotechnology as 
necessitating the risk regulation of incremental innovation.  As a result, evidence-gathering 
has tended to be confined to processes of risk assessment conducted in the implementation of 
existing, generic legislation.  As a consequence, the evidence-base of policy on 
nanotechnology is thin as it only provides information on the application of non-nano specific 
legislative frameworks and through the risk assessments underpinning executive decisions, 
which do not involve the routine gathering of broader information as would be expected of 
IIA.  While the Parliament has managed to insert nano-specific provisions into existing 
legislation, it too has failed to add much to the evidence base of the regulatory framework.  
As a result, and notwithstanding claims about the socio-economically, ‘radically’ innovative 
nature of nanotechnology, the regulatory approach is characterised by a paucity of evidence 
about the social, economic and environmental aspects of nanotechnology and only limited 
engagement with the PP.  This approach is regrettable for several reasons.  It does not allow 
for trade-offs between narrowly defined risks and wider socio-economic impacts (or a more 
substantive use of the PP in this regard), nor does it promote open discussion of the careful 
balance between risk regulation in a narrow sense and other policymaking objectives.  
Moreover, by framing nanotechnology as ‘incremental’ innovation and confining evidence-
gathering to the level of risk assessment at the implementation stage, the Commission has 
bypassed a more broadly informed and more democratic debate on the issue. 
While the regulatory literature has generally paid little attention to the strategic uses 
of ‘innovation’, policymakers are actively involved in conceptualising innovation in order to 
frame regulatory approaches and justify regulatory choices.  The conceptualisation of 
innovation can therefore be understood as an important device in the discursive politics of 
regulation.  In our case study, the approach of the Commission to frame nanotechnology as 
‘incremental’, is unlikely to be unintentional.  Faced with the uncertainty of radical 
innovation, a strategy of ‘deliberate regulatory ignorance’ – enabled by framing the issue as 
merely incremental – might prove an attractive means of avoiding public and political 
conflict that could stifle innovation.  It is doubtful that this approach is unique to 
nanotechnology.   The Commission’s approach in this particular instance is perfectly 
understandable, however it is disappointing from a normative perspective.  The label 
‘incremental’ should not be an excuse to limit exercises in evidence-gathering and avoid 
broader debate.  On the contrary, it could even be argued that public policymaking 
institutions should be more willing to go the extra mile by gathering all possible information 
and allow a democratic debate on innovation that has potentially wide social, economic, 
health and environmental impacts.  Recognising that innovation can be ‘radical’ or 
‘incremental’ along different dimensions (techno-scientific and socio-economic) may help to 
structure the inclusion of more nuanced considerations about legislative reform, the use of 
PP, and requirements of evidence-based policymaking. 
 
 
